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Real sources of entangled photon pairs (like parametric
down conversion) are not perfect. They produce quantum
states that contain more than only one photon pair with some
probability. In this paper it is discussed what happens if such
states are used for the purpose of quantum key distribution.
It is shown that the presence of “multi-pair” signals (together
with low detection efficiencies) causes errors in transmission
even if there is no eavesdropper. Moreover, it is shown that
even the eavesdropping, that draws information only from
these “multi-pair” signals, increases the error rate. Informa-
tion, that can be obtained by an eavesdropper from these
signals, is calculated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The only evincibly secure method of communication
with guaranteed privacy is Vernam cipher (or one-time
pad) [1]. It requires both communicating parties share a
secret key of the same length as the message. Quantum
key distribution (QKD) is a technique to provide two par-
ties with such a secure, secret and shared key. The first
complete protocol for QKD was given by Bennett and
Brassard [2] (BB84) following Wiesner’s ideas [3]. The
essence of this protocol is that if non-orthogonal quantum
states are used for communication and a channel transmit
them perfectly then eavesdropping is detectable. Later a
different protocol, inspired by Bell’s inequalities, was pro-
posed by Ekert [4]. It relies on nonclassical correlations
or entanglement of two quantum particles. Its simplified
(“BB84-like”) version works as follows: Let us suppose
two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, share a set
of entangled pairs (|V 〉A |V 〉B + |H〉A |H〉B)/
√
2, where
|V 〉 and |H〉 are two orthonormal states of each particle
– e.g., vertical and horizontal linear polarizations of pho-
tons. Alice and Bob choose randomly and independently
between two conjugated polarization bases – e.g. between
basis {V,H} (“+”) and the “diagonal” basis (“×”) ro-
tated by 45◦ with respect to it. Following a public dis-
cussion about the basis of the measurement apparatuses,
Alice and Bob can obtain a shared key made up from
those signals where the measurement devices give corre-
lated results. This is so called sifted key.
Photon pairs with correlated polarizations can be pre-
pared, e.g., by parametric down conversion of type II [5]
or using two down-conversion crystals with phase match-
ing of type I [6]. Unfortunately, these techniques never
produce exactly one pair of photons. Quantum states
generated by the both above mentioned down-conversion
methods should be the same in principle. However,
the system with two non-linear crystals is perhaps more
graphical for our purposes. The orientation of the op-
tical axes of two identical crystals are mutually perpen-
dicular. With a vertically (horizontally) polarized pump
beam down-conversion will only occur in the first (sec-
ond) crystal, respectively. A 45◦-polarized pump photon
will be equally likely to down-convert in either crystal.
Let us suppose two spatial modes with two fixed frequen-
cies fulfilling phase-matching conditions. One is aiming
to Alice, the other to Bob. The first crystal generates
beams with vertical polarizations, the second one with
horizontal polarizations. Quantum state generated by
one crystal can be described [7] as1
|ψ〉 = ξ
∞∑
n=0
gn |n〉A |n〉B , (1)
where |n〉 are corresponding number states, ξ =
(coshχt)−1 =
√
1− g2, and g = tanhχt with χ being
proportional to non-linear susceptibility and pump power
and t being interaction time.2 The total quantum state
originating from the both crystals is then3
|Ψ〉 = |ψ〉1 |ψ〉2
= ξ2
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
n=0
gm+n |m〉AV |m〉BV |n〉AH |n〉BH , (2)
where the subscripts V andH denote modes with vertical
polarization (produced by the first crystal) and horizon-
tal polarization (coming from the second crystal), respec-
tively. The mean number of pairs is
µ = ξ4
∑
m,n
(m+ n)g2(m+n) =
2g2
1− g2 . (3)
1Of course, this is just an approximation because more then
only two modes are always present in real cases. If the number
of signal or idler modes is effectively infinite then the total
number of photons in signal or idler beam, respectively, obeys
Poissonian statistics.
2It has good physical meaning only for pulse-pumped down
conversion. Then it may be limited to infinity.
3We neglect a slight decrease of the pump power behind the
first crystal.
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The presence of more than one pair (or more than one
photon in “single-photon” protocols) in the signals may
enable eavesdropper (Eve) to get some information on
the cryptographic key without causing any error. Thus
she can learn something about the key but stay undis-
closed. Similar difficulties implied by the use of weak
coherent states in combination with lossy lines has been
pointed out earlier [8–11]. A comprehensive analysis of
security aspect of practical quantum cryptosystems tak-
ing into account the source imperfections were done in
Ref. [12]. But the role of down-conversion sources was
reduced just to the preparation of approximate single
photon states there. In the present paper we want to
go beyond this limitation.
The article is organized as follows. In Sec. II we ex-
plain, on a simplified signal state containing at most
two pairs of photons, why errors appear in QKD. Im-
perfect detection efficiency and losses on the line are
taken into account. Sec. III contains the comparison
of the amount of information that can be obtained by
Eve from multi-pair or multi-particle signals (by means
of photon-number-splitting attack [12]) for different cryp-
tographic schemes. Particularly for quantum cryptogra-
phy using entangled photons, weak coherent states, and
down-conversion “single-photon” sources. In Sec. IV we
briefly discuss restrictions on Eve’s activity stemming
from monitoring both the data rate and the “double-
click” rate (both detectors corresponding to logical 1 and
0 fire together). Sec. V concludes the article with a short
summary.
FIG. 1. Arrangement for QKD. State preparer, situated at
Alice’s side, generates signal states (2). Both Alice and Bob
have detectors that cannot distinguish the number of imping-
ing photons and whose detection efficiencies are ηA and ηB ,
respectively (this is indicated by circles in the figure). Alice
and Bob change between two orientations of their polariza-
tion analyzers: + and ×. Both communicating parties are
connected by quantum channel with transmittance ηL. This
channel is accessible to Eve.
II. ERRORS IN QKD DUE TO IMPERFECT
SIGNAL STATES
Consider configuration for QKD as in Fig. 1. Let us
suppose that g ≪ 1 so that in Eq. (2) we can neglect all
terms containing more than two pairs:
|Ψ〉 = ξ[ |0, 0, 0, 0〉+ g( |0, 0, 1, 1〉+ |1, 1, 0, 0〉 )
+ g2
( |0, 0, 2, 2〉+ |2, 2, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 1, 1〉 )+O(g3)]. (4)
Here we have used notation
|m,m, n, n〉 = |m〉AV |m〉BV |n〉AH |n〉BH
=
1
m!n!
[(
a
†
AV a
†
BV
)m (
a
†
AHa
†
BH
)n]
|vac〉 (5)
with a† being creation operators in corresponding modes.
In the diagonal basis ×, represented by the following
creation operators
a
†
X = (a
†
V + a
†
H)/
√
2,
a
†
Y = (a
†
V − a†H)/
√
2,
(6)
state (4) does not change its form. It can be shown that
even the full state (2) is invariant under such transfor-
mations of bases (the same transformation at the both
sides).
Losses on the channel and non-perfect efficiency of Al-
ice’s and Bob’s detectors are modeled by beam splitters
with intensity transmittances ηL, ηA, and ηB, respec-
tively. All the detectors are assumed to be “yes/no” de-
tectors, which either fire or do not fire – they cannot
distinguish the number of impinging photons. They may
be described by the pair of projectors: Pno = |0〉〈0| +∑∞
n=1(1−η)n|n〉〈n| and Pyes =
∑∞
n=1[1−(1−η)n]|n〉〈n|,
where η is a detector efficiency. We neglect any noise.
We intend to show that if the detector efficiencies are
lower than 100% the use of signal states (4) causes errors
in the sifted key inevitably. Therefore we are interested
only in that cases when Alice and Bob have set the same
polarization bases. Of course, Alice and Bob include to
the key only that events when exactly one detector fires
at each side. The average relative length of the sifted key
(with respect to the number of all generated entangled
states) is then given by the formula4
Rkey ≈ ξ2g2
{
ηAηBηL
+ g2
[
1− (1− ηA)2
] [
1− (1− ηBηL)2
]
+ 2g2ηA(1 − ηA) ηBηL(1 − ηBηL)
}
. (7)
On the other hand, the relative number of errors (i.e.
events when Alice gets a bit different from that detected
by Bob) is
Rerr ≈ ξ2g4ηA(1− ηA) ηBηL(1− ηBηL). (8)
Thus the error rate reads
ε =
Rerr
Rkey
≈ g
2(1− ηA − ηBηL + ηAηBηL)
1 + g2(6− 4ηA − 4ηBηL + 3ηAηBηL)
=
(1− ηA)(1− ηBηL)
2
µ+O(µ2). (9)
4It is taken into account that only one half of Alice’s and
Bob’s bases coincide in average.
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Clearly, if ηA → 1 then ε→ 0 for all mean pair numbers
µ. So Alice should have as good detectors as possible.
At Bob’s side the crucial limitation would probably be
represented by a low line transmission ηL for real systems.
If ηL ≪ ηA, ηB then ε ≈ (1− ηA)µ/2.
III. INFORMATION LEAKED TO EVE
Let us suppose now that Eve will try to get some infor-
mation on the key only from “multi-particle” (or “multi-
pair”) signals in order not to make any errors in trans-
mission. She will be allowed to use the most efficient indi-
vidual attack of this kind – the photon-number-splitting
(PNS) attack [12]: She substitute a lossy line by a lossless
one. Then she measures the total number of photons in
incoming signals. If this number is higher than one she
extracts and store one photon (or more). The rest is sent
to Bob by her. It is also supposed that she can control
Bob’s detection efficiency, so that Bob always get it. If
the number of incoming photons is equal to one she ei-
ther blocks the signal or passes it without other changes
to Bob (in order not to decrease the data rate). After the
public comparison of Alice’s and Bob’s bases she makes
a polarization measurement on the stored photons.
The average Eve’s information about sifted-key bits is
IE =
∑
i
ri [1 + pi log2 pi + (1− pi) log2(1− pi)] , (10)
where ri is a portion of bits that Eve knows with prob-
ability pi;
∑
i ri = 1. If Eve knows r per cent bits for
certain and she has no idea about the others then simply
IE = r.
A. Weak coherent states
First let us look at the case of quantum cryptography
with weak coherent states (WCS). The expected average
relative length of the sifted key (in proportion to the
number of all sent signals) is [10,12]
Rexp =
1
2
[1− exp(−ηLηBµ′)] ,
where µ′ is a mean photon number in a signal state, ηB
denotes Bob’s detector efficiency. The average relative
number of “multi-photon” signals is given by the formula
Rmulti =
1
2
[1− (1 + µ′) exp(−µ′)] .
Eve can learn all the bits stemming from these “multi-
photon” signals with certainty. Thus the information
leaked to Eve reads
I
(WCP)
E =


1 if Rexp ≤ Rmulti,
Rmulti
Rexp
≈ 1
2ηLηB
µ′, otherwise.
(11)
B. Parametric down conversion
Now, what information may leak to Eve if a paramet-
ric down-conversion (PDC) source of “single” photons is
used instead of laser producing coherent states? Gener-
ated signal states (with fixed polarizations) are used for
BB84 QKD-protocol in the exactly same manner as WCS
[12]. The source consist of a single down-conversion crys-
tal generating state (1) and a “yes/no” detector (with an
efficiency ηA) placed in one of the two output modes.
A click on this detector means that the signal state has
been prepared at the other mode. The expected aver-
age relative length of the sifted key (in proportion to the
number of all generated entangled states) is given by the
formula
Rexp =
ξ2
2
∞∑
n=0
g2n [1− (1 − ηA)n] [1− (1 − ηLηB)n] .
The average relative number of “multi-photon” signals
reads
Rmulti =
ξ2
2
∞∑
n=2
g2n [1− (1− ηA)n] .
Again, Eve can learn all the bits carried by the “multi-
photon” signals with certainty. After some straightfor-
ward calculations one can find the amount of information
leaked to her:5
I
(PDC)
E =


1 if Rexp ≤ Rmulti,
Rmulti
Rexp
≈ 2− ηA
ηLηB
µ′′, otherwise,
(12)
were we have used the fact that in the case under con-
sideration the mean number of pairs in each generated
entangled state is µ′′ = g2/(1− g2).
C. Entangled photons
Finally let us look at the cryptographic scheme fully
based on entanglement of photon polarizations (EP); see
Fig. 1. Signal states are described by Eq. (2). All the
detectors are “yes/no” ones again; on Alice’s side they
have efficiencies ηA, on Bob’s side ηB .
Here the situation is more complex. It becomes impor-
tant how many photons Eve separates. However, we will
confine ourselves only to the simplified situation when at
most to pairs are present with a reasonable probability
[see Eq. (4)]. Then Eve can separate no more than one
photon and send remaining one to Bob. In contrast to
5It can be done exactly but for our purposes the shown ap-
proximation is good enough.
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the both cases described above, now the information IAE
that Eve shares with Alice is different from the informa-
tion IEB that she shares with Bob. This is connected
with the occurrence of errors in transmission.
The expected rate of sifted-key generation is given by
Eq. (7): Rexp = Rkey. A portion of two-photon signals
leaving Alice’s terminal – that signals that can be read
by Eve applying PNS attack – is
Rdouble = ξ
2g4
{[
1− (1− ηA)2
]
+ ηA(1− ηA)
}
.
The first term represents contributions from states
|0, 0, 2, 2〉 and |2, 2, 0, 0〉 the second one from |1, 1, 1, 1〉.
Only when exactly one detector clicks the bit is accepted
to the key.
Calculating information it must be taken into account
that now Eve does not know all measured bits with cer-
tainty. She cannot distinguish the signals stemming from
states |1, 1, 1, 1〉 from the other two-photon signals. And
for these particular signals she hits Alice’s bit only with
probability 50% and Bob’s bit values are even always
opposite to hers. Thus Eve’s average information is
I
(EP)
j ≈


f(pj) if Rexp ≤ Rdouble,
Rdouble
Rexp
f(pj) ≈ 3− 2ηA
2ηLηB
f(pj)µ, otherwise,
(13)
where j = AE,EB and f(pj) = 1 + pj log2 pj + (1 −
pj) log2(1− pj). Probabilities that Eve knows Alice’s (or
Bob’s) bit, respectively, are given by the ratio of success-
ful results to all results:
pAE =
5− 3ηA
6− 4ηA , pEB =
2− ηA
3− 2ηA .
Clearly, f(pEB) < f(pAE) < 1 for ηA < 1 and then
also IEB < IAE < 1. Unfortunately, the fact that
the maximum Eve’s information [see Eq. (13)] is lower
than unity (if ηA < 1) does not represent any real ad-
vantage because for Rexp ≤ Rdouble information IAE is
equal to information shared by Alice and Bob, IAB =
1 + ε′ log2 ε
′ + (1− ε′) log2(1− ε′).
Notice the other important feature of PNS eavesdrop-
ping in EP systems which is similar to “single particle”
attacks: If Eve applies PNS attack by the way described
above, i.e. if she tries to reproduce only the transmission
rate (Rexp), she increases the error rate. The reason is
that she increases the portion of |1, 1, 1, 1〉 contributions
to the key bits. Clearly, this portion gets the following
value: R
(E)
err = ξ2g4ηA(1−ηA)/2. Thus due to eavesdrop-
ping the error rate grows to
ε′ =


R
(E)
err
Rdouble
≈ 1− ηA
6− 4ηA , if Rexp ≤ Rdouble,
R
(E)
err
Rexp
≈ 1− ηA
4ηBηL
µ. otherwise,
(14)
The increase of error rate can help to detect an eaves-
dropper what is impossible in the analogous situation
(PNS attack) with WCS and PDC systems.
IV. HOW TO RESTRICT EVE’S ACTIVITY
In the previous section Eve was restricted by the de-
mand to reproduce transmission rate (average number of
sifted-key bits) only. However, it is not the only quantity
which could be monitored by Bob. In all the mentioned
techniques Bob can also measure the double-click rate in
that events when he used a different basis than Alice. In
case of EP Bob can even monitor double-click rate in sit-
uations with coincident bases (and, of course, the error
rate). Clearly such Bob’s activities pose other important
restrictions to Eve [13]. Even more possibilities are of-
fered by passive arrangement, when Alice and Bob do
not change bases actively (see, e.g., Ref. [14]).
V. CONCLUSIONS
We discussed the effect of “multi-pair signals”, that in-
evitably appear in any system with a parametric-down-
conversion source, on the security of quantum cryptogra-
phy. We have shown that there is an important difference
between the quantum-cryptographic setup that uses such
a source just as a “triggered source of photons” and that
which employs the entanglement of pairs of generated
signals directly for quantum key distribution. In the lat-
ter case there is a still nonzero error rate even if there
is no eavesdropper. This is caused by the joint effect of
the occurrence of “multi-pair signals” and of low detec-
tion efficiencies. However, the most important result is
that in the latter setup an individual eavesdropping on
“multi-pair signals” increases the error rate in the trans-
mission.
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